Rwanda Genocide Peace Agreement

To adapt an old metaphor when Rwanda aegean, Congo and Burundi got cold. It is common knowledge that ongoing conflicts in Congo, Rwanda and Burundi are inseparable through cross-border uprisings, cross-border ethnic ties and cross-border economic ties. The legacy of the genocide – both the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which killed nearly a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and the minor but no less significant genocide of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 – and major community massacres such as the 1993 Massacre of Tutsis in Burundi are heavily suspended over the Great Lakes region. The cycles of violence and the culture of impunity, which have worsened as a result of these torments, must be overcome to enable peace and reconciliation in Central Africa. The Arusha Agreement, the 1993 power-sharing agreement reached by most of Rwanda`s major political forces, was seen as a threat to the existing power bloc as the genocide was planned and carried out to prevent its implementation. Given this historical context and the widespread involvement of the previous ruling class in the genocide, the Rwandan government considers that the negotiations are not sufficient to achieve peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, particularly with regard to the elements related to those who organized the 1994 genocide. U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson responds to a Request from the State Department as to why Rwanda should have economic support (ESF) and why support for the demobilization program is important. Rawson writes: „On both sides of this conflict, the need for demobilization, the importance of demobilization for the peace process, and the usefulness of demobilization as an instrument in the reconstruction process are unanimous. It is a cause that is fully supported by all Rwandan political parties.

After the massive return of refugees after Rwanda`s attack on the Zairian refugee camps in 1996, thousands of ex-FAR/Interahamwe (the former Rwandan army and the associated militia that committed the 1994 genocide) returned to Rwanda and intensified their brutal insurgency. The insurgents were mainly directed at the civilian population, including bus passengers, local government officials and schoolchildren. The insurgency was aimed at making the northwest ungovernable, restoring the former government, evading justice for those who committed the genocide and ending the genocide. The command and control structure remains largely intact by the one that carried out the 1994 genocide. In Burundi, on the other hand, external and internal negotiation processes are the most important means of resolving conflicts. With former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere as organizer, the Arusha peace process began in mid-1998. Its objective is to negotiate a transitional regime and an electoral calendar. Arusha has made progress in getting different opposing groups to sit down together and talk about the necessary reforms. But many analysts blame the lack of substantial negotiations in Arusha for procedural maneuvers, poses and haggling over future positions. In addition, the main armed opposition groups, the FDD and the FNC, are not represented in the discussions, including compromises agreements on security issues.